Sunday, October 11, 2026

Hero For Two Hours

The 1940 season in the American League was unusual in that the mighty Yankees gave somebody else a chance. The 1939 season had been business as usual for the Bronx Bombers. MVP Joe DiMaggio led them to the pennant by a staggering margin of 17 games over the second-place Red Sox. The upcoming 1941 season would virtually be a carbon copy of 1939: another 17-game margin over the runner-up Red Sox; another MVP for the great DiMaggio, who threw in a 56-game hitting streak as icing on the cake. But 1940 was different. The Red Sox fell to fourth, and the Yankees found themselves going down to the wire with the Indians and Tigers. 

* The Tigers had assembled the league's best offense in 1940, scoring 888 runs, anchored by a monster year from Hank Greenberg, who batted .340 and led the league in both doubles and homers. Their pitching wasn't as strong - 4th in the league in runs allowed. 

* The Indians had the opposite skills. Their anemic offense finished 6th in the 8-team league in runs scored, but they easily finished first in runs allowed, led by a 21-year-old phenom named Bob Feller, who won 27 games and seemed unhittable when he was on. 

* The Yankees had an off year, but still finished 3rd in offense and 2nd in pitching. Their great catcher, Bill Dickey, had suffered a dramatic decline; outfielder Tommy Henrich was plagued by injuries; and they had a hole in the lineup where shortstop used to be, as Frankie Crosetti batted .194 in his last year as the starter until a war-depleted roster forced him back into action. He would be replaced the next season by future MVP Phil Rizzuto, who supplanted Crosetti's .194 with a sparkling .307 in his rookie year. 

Here is how the race stood on the morning of September 27th.


The Tigers and Indians, as fate would have it, were scheduled to play one another in their final three games, meaning that the Yankees still held out a very slim hope for a tie that would force a playoff. If they could have won their last four games, they would have reached 90 wins, which would have resulted in a playoff with the right combination of Tiger and Indian victories. If the Indians won two of the three, it would leave the Tigers at 90 wins, the Indians at 89. If the Indians won all three, it would elevate the Tribe to 90, with the Tigers at 89. But the Yankees lost their game on September 27th, eliminating them mathematically, since they could win no more than 89, and one of the other teams had to reach 90 no matter how their three games shook out.

That meant the Cleveland-Detroit series would decide the pennant. Detroit needed to win only one of the three, but manager Del Baker decided it would not be the first one because the Tigers had to face the "unbeatable" Bob Feller on his home turf. Feller came into the game with 27 wins, including a daunting 15-3 record at home. Baker had two excellent pitchers at his disposal, Bobo Newsom (21-5) and Schoolboy Rowe (16-3), but decided that the best way to guarantee the single victory he needed was to start those two in games two and three, against the weaker pitchers on the Cleveland staff. He felt that they would be wasted against Rapid Robert Feller, the greatest pitcher of the era, who was likely to beat anyone he faced. Baker decided simply to throw a sacrificial lamb on the altar of the great Feller. The logic was sound, although it is not typical for a team to basically concede a crucial game. 

Who would Baker choose to lose to Feller? Nobody knew until they saw a newcomer warming up. Nobody knew even then, because the newcomer was not familiar. Cleveland fans had to rush to their scorecards to figure out who he was. Even when they figured it out, they didn't believe it. He was a late-season call-up, a 30-year-old named Floyd Giebell, who had pitched only 24 major-league innings and had spent the 1940 season at Buffalo, where he had done no better than a mediocre 15-17 record. The Cleveland radio announcers didn't even know how to pronounce his name. (It was GEE-bull. It rhymed with "feeble.") Surely, this was some kind of feint by Del Baker, thought the sportswriters, and a look beneath the grandstands would reveal Rowe or Newsom warming up to be the real starter. Not so. Giebell, a mystery man who rarely spoke, a lanky fellow who wore a naive and eternally disoriented expression on his face, was the man.

How does a man even get to be a virtual rookie at age 30? Was he one of those guys who had been in the minors since he was a teenager? Not at all. His story was much better than that. 

Like any player who makes it to the major leagues, Giebell was a standout in high school sports, but when he graduated, he went neither to college nor the minor leagues. He grew up on a West Virginia farm, and his dad had become partially disabled in an accident, so Floyd set aside whatever dreams he might have had to stay at home and keep the family farm afloat. Four years later, when his parents had relocated, he enrolled in a local college where he could study, play ball, and work summers for a local steel mill. He continued to work at that steel plant after graduation, and that turned out to be the key to his future. In 1937, Giebell led a team of Weirton Steel players to a national amateur championship, where some big-league scouts spotted and courted him. He became a professional ballplayer at age 28. 

He had been brilliant in his first professional season, winning 18 games with a 1.98 ERA in the low minors, but his subsequent minor-league seasons were far less impressive. Even so, his ability to change speeds and keep hitters off balance had earned him enough respect from his managers that they recommended him for a shot at the Big Show. He had not embarrassed himself in his few major-league appearances, but neither had he earned a permanent roster spot. 

What happened that day? I think you already know, because this page would not exist if Giebell had lost. Feller was every bit as good as advertised, going the distance and allowing only three hits. But the wind was blowing out that day, and it carried one of those three hits barely over the fence. 

That was all Giebell needed. He pitched a complete-game shutout. He allowed no extra-base hits and only two walks. When Giebell retired Jeff Heath to record the last out of the game, Detroit had won the pennant. His Tiger teammates carried him off the field, while he wore his familiar bewildered expression, as if failing to comprehend that he had just beaten Bob Feller.



Here is how the Detroit newspapers covered the story the next day: The Free Press, The Detroit News. The Cleveland Plain Dealer thought the story was too big to be relegated to the sports pages. They made it the headline on the front page, above the war news from London and Washington. 




According to the rules of the day, Giebell was not eligible to play in the World Series, although his manager told him he would have started Game 3 if the rules had permitted it. So Giebell would have to wait until 1941 for his next win.

He is still waiting. 

His grand victory over Feller was his last major-league win. 

Some years later, a veteran Detroit baseball writer named Charles Ward wrote an article about Giebell called "Hero for a Day - and then Oblivion." I headlined this story by calling Floyd a hero for two hours. I was wrong. Ward was wrong. Yes, Giebell was only allowed two hours to bask in athletic glory, but that's not heroism. That's just a figurative term we use. It's a form of success that's not really important in the grand scheme. 

What is important? He set aside his athletic dreams to help his dad on the farm. He served his country in World War Two, although he had a wife, a young child, and elderly parents who depended on him. He personally answered every fan letter he ever received. He raised a fine family and endured the heartbreaking loss of a son, a decorated soldier killed in Vietnam. He and his wife eventually celebrated their 62nd anniversary, which occasioned a tribute in the Detroit Free Press.



So Floyd Giebell was not a hero for two hours.

He was a hero for life.

Wednesday, September 16, 2026

Was DiMaggio’s single-season hit streak the least likely long streak?

Were there other streaks less likely than Joe's.
Yes, but only one.

If all players had equal ability, then Joe DiMaggio's hit streak would be the least likely by far, simply because it was the longest by far. Think of it this way: no other player in history ever had a 46 game hit streak, but DiMaggio had 11 of them! (Games 1-46 of his famous streak, all the way to games 11-56). He's light years beyond anyone else.

But here's the thing: all players do not have equal ability. The odds against my hitting in two consecutive games would be greater than the odds of DiMaggio hitting in 56. I won't be getting a chance, but unequal ability also affects the odds in the real world.

Hit streaks are a factor of two things:

(1) How likely was a player to hit in each game?

(2) How many games did he play?

In turn, factor one has two components

(1a) How many times did he get to the plate? 

(1b) How likely was he to get a hit each time?

Joe DiMaggio was almost uniquely positioned among modern players to succeed in factor one.

(1a) He played for a great offensive team, and batted near the top of the line-up, so he batted frequently. His likelihood would have been even higher if he had batted lead-off, because he would have come to the plate an additional .33 times per game. That doesn't sound like much, but it would have made his streak four times more likely!

(1b) He was a great hitter who didn't walk much, so he had a high likelihood of getting a hit in each at bat. He was far more likely to get a hit in any given appearance than, for example, Ted Williams, because Williams walked a lot, and walks don't count toward a hit streak.

On the other hand, DiMaggio didn't rank very high on factor two in 1941.

(2) He played in only 139 games, meaning that he only had 84 opportunities for a 56 game single-season streak. Any streak begun in game 85 or later would have to end before it could reach 56.

The great achievement of DiMaggio's streak rests on the power of exponents. Sure, he had an 80% likelihood to get a hit in any given game, but any decimal taken to the 56th power becomes a very small decimal. Even with Joe D's great ability, the odds against that hit streak were about 8000-to-1.

DiMaggio's streak was highly unlikely, even with DiMaggio's hot hitting that year. If you were to replay DiMaggio's season again and again on an infinite loop with our statistical model of his 1941 performance, he would reach 56 or more every 7,797 seasons. It was a statistical anomaly, even with expectations raised in deference to the talent of the great DiMag.

But Uggla's streak was beyond anomalous and into the territory of miraculous. Dan Uggla was less likely to hit in 33 consecutive games than DiMaggio was to hit in 56. Far less likely. About 16 times less likely. In order to match the statistical improbability of Uggla's streak, DiMaggio would have had to hit in 69 consecutive games.

Somehow, Uggla hit in 33 consecutive games despite having relatively few plate appearances per game and a low probability of getting a hit in any one of them. How did it happen? Uggla, a mediocre hitter, simply went on one of the all-time hot streaks. In those 33 games, he batted .377 with 15 homers. During the rest of the year, Uggla batted .194. That 183-point difference is uncanny.

DiMaggio batted .408 during the streak and “only” .321 the rest of the year, but it isn't especially strange for a hitter of DiMaggio's caliber to have a long hot streak in which he maintains a .400 average. In 1939, Joe D was batting .443 for the entire season as late as July 13. The explanation for 1941 is not that Joe D avoided hitless games. He had many of them, 25 to be exact. The magic of 1941 is how those 25 hitless games were distributed. They managed to stay out of the streak. That distribution was rare, but there was really no radical upswing in his performances. It is not unusual for DiMaggio to hit like DiMaggio.

But it is unusual for a .194 hitter to hit like DiMaggio, and Uggla did just that. DiMaggio's OPS was 1.181 during his streak. Uggla's was 1.200 in his.

Nobody can explain it. It just is.

Were there streaks that were predictable?
Yes. Sort of. There was never a streak of 30 or more that was an even money bet, but there were a few that came pretty close,

If the model were to recreate Ed Delahanty's season on that infinite loop I mentioned, it would reveal that Big Ed would post a 30-game streak approximately every five years. While DiMaggio was performing at the top of his game, and Uggla seemed to have signed a short-term pact with Satan, Delahanty was simply conducting business as usual. Yes, he batted .422 during the streak, but he also hit .406 in his other games. That mere 16-point difference compares to 87 for DiMaggio and 183 for Uggla.

Were there individual seasons that were even more streak-friendly, but didn't produce one?
Yes, there is one that really stands out, and a few honorable mentions, but there is nothing in the past hundred years.

Hugh Duffy had the most likely season to produce a 30-game streak. No other season came close. He accumulated nearly five plate appearances per game and got a hit in more than 38% of his plate appearances. Both factors are close to all-time records at the modern pitching distance. He was so efficient in 1894 that he was about an even bet to pull off a 30-game streak, but he did not. He did reach 26.

Of the eight seasons most likely to produce a 30-game hit streak, only three actually did.

Note that George Sisler has two seasons on the list. His 1920 season did not produce a 30-game streak, but his 1922 season more than made up for it with a 41-game streak, which remained the 20th-century record until DiMaggio obliterated it in 1941, and still ranks third in the century behind DiMaggio and Pete Rose.

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FOOTNOTE:

The calculation is season-based, not streak-based. In other words:

* It calculates how often how often the characteristics of a particular season will produce a streak of 56 games or more. In DiMaggio's case, such a streak will occur every 7,797 years

* It does not calculate the frequency of 56-game streaks. One DiMaggio streak will occur on the average, every 1,554 years. This is because some years will include multiple streaks of exactly 56 games. They come in clumps. A 57-game streak, for example, is by definition two 56-game streaks, one from game 1 through game 56 and one from game 2 through game 57. In that sense, as noted at the beginning of the article, DiMaggio has 11 streaks of 46 or more. While this is mathematically correct, it is not especially useful information, since we think of DiMaggio's streak simply as 56 games, not as 11 consecutive 46-game streaks.

Thus, in 100,000 such seasons:

* There will be 64 streaks of exactly 56 games (one per 1554).

BUT

* There will be only 13 seasons including a streak of 56 or longer (one every 7997).

Thursday, September 3, 2026

The Mount Rushmore of baseball names




I call it Mount Blushmore, the truly embarrassing names.


Baseball is known for colorful monikers, so there have been many to chose from. Too many to single out just four. But four is the number of the mountain. The four presidents carved on Rushmore allow for debate, as do the four names enshrined on Blushmore.

Tony Suck

Ugly Dickshot

Cuckoo Christy

Pebbly Jack Glasscock


I discussed the apotheosis of those names and the men behind them here.